|
Sir Ernst Gombrich
Hailed in the later years of his life as the worlds
greatest art historian, E H Gombrich has been described in a number
of obituaries following his death at the age of 92 on 3 November
2001, as the most important writer on art from any period. It is
easy to see why. Following The Story of Art (1950)
now in its 16th edition and translated into more languages than
most of us could list he published the seminal Art and
Illusion (1960) which totally rewrote the psychology of representation,
and a series of unfailingly lucid studies of subjects ranging from
Renaissance symbolism to the visual language of contemporary cartoons.
But he was more than a great writer in his field.
Indeed, he abhorred the concept of fields, which he
thought appropriate for donkeys but not human beings. His territory
was the great traditional area of the humanities; that is to say
the study of those human products that represented the highest aspirations
of humane culture in literature, the arts, and not least in music.
His mother, sister and wife, Ilse, were professionally trained musicians,
and he was himself an accomplished exponent of the cello.
His commitment to the humanities as an ideal, now
often scorned in the era of postmodernism, was not merely a genteel
adherence to abstract notions of the civilising effects of culture.
As an Austrian Jew he saw, in a way to which few living Europeans
can attest, what happened when culture is manipulated and abused
by totalitarian ideologies. Leaving Vienna in 1936, he joined the
Warburg Institute in London, itself recently exiled from Hamburg
in the face of Nazi oppression. The Warburg was henceforth to be
his place of employment and spiritual home, and he served as its
Director between 1959 and 1976.
This background gave especial force to his implacable
rejection of all overarching ideologies that purport to fit human
society into ideal frameworks. This was as true of the philosophical
tyranny of ideas (of which he thought Hegel was a prime perpetrator)
as it was of such political dogmas as Fascism and Communism. Like
Aby Warburg himself, whose psychology in other respects Gombrich
found troubling, the mission to illuminate culture in the face of
darkness mattered too much to be a literally academic matter.
For someone committed to communication in words and
to how things are represented in images, it was both appropriate
and deeply informative for him to have spent the war with the BBC
Monitoring Service at Evesham. His experiences both cemented his
sense that every portion of communication is dependent on its context
in a system, and fortified his instinct that the student of representation
needs to look beyond the field of high art. It was the former conviction
that persuaded him that the claims for absolute communication in
abstract art were humbug, while the latter encouraged such tours
de force as setting Raphaels Madonna della Sedia
beside an advertisement from a rotary shaver.
The two public peaks of his career as an author manifest
different but related facets of his vision. The Story of Art
remains the best doorway into the history of art, widely recognised
as such even by those who share little or nothing of Gombrichs
particular attitudes. It retains its supremacy as a coherent adventure
journey in ways of looking within cultural contexts. The vision
is huge but open; the voice is deeply learned yet easy to understand.
The reader becomes naturalised in acts of intelligent seeing in
such a way that alternative modes of looking become subsequently
more accessible.
Art and Illusion, in which the relatively youthful
discipline of perceptual psychology was brought into play in the
long-standing quest to define why styles evolved, set enduring terms
for the debate about seeing and artistic representation. What he
sought, at heart, was a rational explanation of why an Egyptian
did not paint like a Constable. He wished to understand the collective
enterprise of representation to which artists contributed over the
centuries without appealing to the great forces of the zeitgeist
or collective psychology. This understanding was to be framed in
terms of both the cultural imperatives that determined the roles
of images, and the business of seeing and knowing.
His key contribution was to formulate a process of
making and matching in which the need for the remaking
of schemata (or formulas of representation) to achieve
better matches was fuelled by the growing sense in the Western tradition
that images should place the spectator in the role of an eye-witness.
The achieving of a more refined optical match was not to result
from the cultivation of an innocent eye, but by persistent
historical testing of the ways that images can achieve high levels
of verisimilitude. The step-by-step progress of naturalistic representation
was cast in terms akin to the notion of hypothesis and falsification,
developed in the philosophy of science by his friend and fellow
exile, Sir Karl Popper.
In this quest, he stood resolutely behind the idea
that the illusionistic picture, made according to the rules of perspective,
did its job as an optically convincing surrogate in a superior way
to any other system. Perspective, for him, was not merely another
convention. Cubism, for instance, could not sustain claims that
it was truer to how we see things than a Constable landscape or
a photograph. In his arguments with doughty opponents, such as the
philosopher Nelson Goodman, he resorted increasingly to the evidence
of occlusion as the irrefutable common fact of perspective
and seeing. That is to say, the extent to which foreground objects
(even small ones) systematically overlap and conceal background
features according to inviolable rules, testified to the essential
congruence between what our visual apparatus does, the rules of
the perspective picture and what is out there.
Even if there was some rapprochement between Gombrich
and Goodman as their ideas evolved, Gombrich remained vulnerable
to the charge that he defined artistic worth in terms of the gold
standard of Western naturalism. In fact, he was saying that the
naturalistic skills hard won by Western artists were superior at
doing the job of eye-witness presentation not that this job
was itself to be taken as defining artistic or aesthetic superiority.
He pointed with a certain impatience to his writings on the glories
and fascination of other modes of image making, most particularly
in his Sense of Order (1979) which he fairly believed to
be a neglected book.
It is true, however, that he entertained limited sympathy
with much of the art of his own era, not only extreme forms of abstraction
but also, perhaps more surprisingly, with those movements like Pop
Art that re-introduced figuration and the interplay of word and
image. He confessed to me that he did not begin to understand Rauschenberg,
and conceded that he was perhaps asking for a kind of shared validity
between artistic theory and artistic product that he did not require
of art from other eras. He did not, for instance, reject Renaissance
art because it was founded on a notion of proportional beauty to
which we no longer adhere. On the other hand, he was be ill-disposed
towards the Abstract Expressionists because he did not countenance
claims that their art was achieving some autonomous level of direct
communion with the spectator.
Such prejudices and oversights as Gombrich might have
perpetrated are, however, a small price to pay for the greatness
of his vision, and his rejection of absolute systems, intellectual
or political. Unlike the younger generation, he could hear in his
minds ear the jack-boots marching when intolerance resulted
from blind confidence in beliefs that trample human liberties. His
death has occurred at a time when his humane values are more than
ever in need of sustenance.
Martin Kemp
Published in Italian in Il Sole 24 Ore
|